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Europe and the nation-state
Despite past and present affirmations of the "end of 
ideology", we are living in a period deeply charged with 
ideology, whether proclaimed with genuine faith or far less 
altruistic motives of market speculation. One of the side- 
effects of this is a tendency towards historically superficial 
and above all short-term explanations of the current crises, 
whose inadequacy is only too apparent. Little more than a 
year ago - the year of the bicentenary of the French 
revolution and the collapse of the communist regimes of 
eastern Europe - the historical explanations of what was 
happening were permeated with ideological expectations of a 
brave new world. Today, nationalism is re-emerging in the 
xenophobic forms of the half century between the 1880's and 
the 1930's, recession is pricking the balloon of complacent 
certainty of the spokesmen of the western market economy as a 
universal panacea, war is displaying the fragility of the 
independent equilibrium of international relations. 
Discussion of the relationship between Europe and the nation­
state has shown itself to be as superficial and ahistorical.
At moments of rapid political and social change, 
historians - like other social scientists - are less confident 
about the assumptions on which they have based their 
interpretations and look afresh at their theoretical premises. 
Given the acceleration of the pace of change over the past 
fifty years, historians of my generation have been forced or 
privileged (the choice of term depending on personal humours 
and inclinations) to stand back and reflect critically on 
what they do, more frequently and more continuously than their 
predecessors over the past two centuries, who for the most 
part derived a greater self-confidence from the values of the 





























































































Historians have always enjoyed a privileged position 
because their subject matter is regarded by the general public 
as more accessible and understandable than that of their 
social science colleagues. History, after all, is close to 
story-telling - and indeed is regarded by many among the 
general public, both ordinary folk and politicians, as 
possessing as tenuous a tie as literature to reality and 
matters of practical relevance. History, because of its very 
accessibility to one and all, makes the historian particularly 
vulnerable. He or she can take refuge (like his or her social 
science colleagues and indeed all the professions) in the 
opacity of a specifically developed technical jargon that is 
guaranteed to keep the uninitiated at arm's length. But in so 
doing, he not only loses that privileged relationship with his 
audience. Far worse, he voluntarily renounces his pedagogical 
role, his deep though often unexpressed belief in the 
explanatory (although not the predictive) function of history. 
He abandons the field to the amateurs and worse, that motley 
crowd of superficial and racy narrators, in whose company he 
feels as uncomfortable and unfriendly as did the emerging 
profession of medical doctors in the 18th century towards the 
nature-healers whom they described uncharitably as 
"charlatans".
The result is what some have begun to call a "crisis of 
history"(l). The phenomenon is not a new one, and its very 
recurrence at moments of dramatic change merits serious 
reflection by historians about the relationship between what 
they do and their reading public, given the ambivalence of the 
function of history in society. Nowadays, whatever their 
desire to instruct and not merely to entertain, historians 
cannot but question the remoteness of their specialised 
production from a socially highly differentiated but expanding 
reading public. Thè potential of such a market in this post­
modern, quintessentially consumer society has been more ably 
assessed by those whom historians dismiss as popularisers, who 




























































































At first sight, the specificity of Europe may seem so 
obvious as not to merit further discussion. Whether in 
literary or iconographic form, from the narrators of ancient 
Greece or the cartographers of the middle ages and early 
modern period, "Europe" - as we call it - is represented at 
the centre of an expanding world. It is an image that 
continued, unchallenged, until the cataclysm of the second 
world war definitively revealed Europe's relative weakness. 
Although Chinese cartography offers a very different 
representation of the world, although Greek culture may have 
owed much to Phoenician and Egyptian colonisation, the 
Eurocentric view of the universe has remained unchallenged. 
Indeed, as Martin Bernal has recently argued, it was the very 
sense of superiority of Europe that led to the expunging from 
the historical record of any suggestion of the Afroasian 
origins of ancient Greece (2).
Our self-image of Europe is of course relatively recent, 
certainly not predating the high middle ages. When we write 
of the Greeks and Romans as the source of European 
civilisation, we appropriate to such an idea a geographical 
dimension that could not have been conceivable to any Greek or 
Roman. The first historically and politically significant 
assertion of the very existence of Europe is Charlemagne's 
claim in A.D. 800 to be head of a Holy Roman Empire, whose 
centre was to be Aachen in succession to Rome. But where an 
ideal continuity exists, from ancient Greece and Rome to very 
recent times, is the definition of this civilisation in terms 
of its difference from, and superiority over, the ‘barbarians' 
outside its frontiers, whether the Persians dismissed by 
Aristotle, the tribes that overran the Roman empire, the Arabs 
and Ottomans, or, later, the Russians (3). In anthropological 
terms, this structural dependence of the concept of Europe on 
the existence of the 'other' needs no explanation. Less clear 
(to the point of raising at least flickers of doubt among some 




























































































readable narration of the lives and political actions of the 
great, and in this can claim a direct descent from Herodotus, 
the ancestor of all historians.
This is not the time or place for developing such 
reflections. But it may serve the purpose of highlighting the 
need for professional historians to respond deliberately to 
the challenges presented to their interpretive grids by the 
dramatic changes of the past few years. For if they do not, 
the misuse of history - which has always existed because of 
the particular suitability of the subject for justificatory, 
triumphalistic or purely declamatory purposes - may in present 
circumstances even, indirectly, result in dangerous practical 
consequences. It is incumbent upon those of us who are 
involved at the cutting edge of historical research to attempt 
to suggest deeper and more plausible interpretations, based on 
more detached and longer-term considerations of the very 
ambiguities of the particular forms of historical development 
which have shaped and conditioned current crises. Such an 
agenda is far beyond the possibilities of one lecture. But in 
a research and postgraduate school like the EUI, characterised 
by its cross-national composition as a scholarly community and 
its constant sensibility towards the problematic 
interconnections between national and European identities, and 
for an Englishman - given the British habit of excluding 
themselves from what they call "Europe" -,it seems 
particularly appropriate at the present time to choose as the 
theme of the Jean Monnet lecture the subject of Europe and the 
nation-state.
It is in order, I hope, in an Institute like ours for an 
Englishman to adopt the French structure of an academic 
lecture. My talk will be divided into three parts, the first 
dedicated to Europe, the second to the nation-state, with some 
considerations in the final part on the implications today of 




























































































to the "barbarians" between the superior indifference of the 
Chinese and the expansive aggressivity of Europeans.
What perhaps merits a comment is how, in the longue duree, 
such a self-definition has influenced the attribution of the 
geographical confines of European civilisation. What was 
regarded as the area of European culture by philosophers and 
writers from the Renaissance, but especially from the 
Enlightenment, not only periodically shifted its frontiers, 
but was a misfit in terms of our modern geographic definition 
of Europe : the eastern Mediterranean of ancient Greece 
included Asia Minor but excluded Europe north of the Alps, 
Roman civilisation incorporated north Africa, the 
identification of Christianity with Europe implied a 
retraction of the south-eastern frontier with the fall of 
Byzantium and a successive geographic expansion northwards 
culminating in the "third Rome" of Muscovy. Perhaps it is the 
millenial identification of Europe with empire and 
Christianity that explains why the historiography of the 
concept of Europe is predominantly concerned with the ancient 
and medieval world (4). What is clear is that the search for 
the cultural origins of Europe, like the discussions that it 
has generated, bear little relationship - except in rhetorical 
and chauvinistic terms - to our modern and contemporary 
understanding of Europe.
It is through the Enlightenment writers that Europe has 
acquired the particular connotations which have been passed 
down, with remarkably little modification, through the 
generations to the present day. It is difficult to argue, it 
seems to me, in terms of an uninterrupted historical 
continuity of the concept of Europe, from Greek and Roman 
times through to the past two centuries, except as a 
geographical area (and even then, as I have noted, with 
changing frontiers). For the idea of Europe as a cultural 
tradition stretching over the centuries is historically highly 
ambiguous, open to a multiple choice of often contradictory 



























































































by Voltaire, Condorcet and Gibbon and elevated into a 
philosophy of history by Hegel. The idea of Europe, as we 
understand it today, is a concept constructed in the 
Enlightenment, consolidated in the romantic era and diffused 
through Europe's economic expansion and colonisation across 
the world in the nineteenth century. Like the idea of the 
nation-state, the European tradition is a cultural invention.
The success of this tradition in establishing itself as a 
historical reality demands an analysis of its constitutive 
parts. Three elements are central to the representation of 
the superiority of Europe over the rest of the world, elements 
which achieved the fullness of their form in the century 
between Montesquieu's Esprit des lois and the revolutions of 
1848.
The first, and most widely recognised element is what 
Norberto Bobbio has called the "European ideology" (6). It is 
the affirmation that, in contrast to the despotism merited by 
more servile peoples, liberty has always characterised the 
European tradition of government. Compared to 'other' 
peoples, whether the subjects of the Asiatic despots or the 
indigenous conquered populations of north and south America, 
European leadership was intrinsically related to the liberty 
of its governance. Liberty could embrace a variety of forms 
of government, from republic to temperate monarchy. What was 
constant, at least from the sixteenth cenh century, from 
Machiavelli to Bodin, from Montesquieu to Hegel, with glances 
back to the Greek city-state, was the attribution of the 
superiority of European states to the liberty incorporated in 
their administration of the res publica, which stood in 
opposition to the arbitrary disposal of power typical of 
despotism, whether oriental or not. The passage was short 
from this more formally institutional definition of the 
specificity of the European state to the idea of Europe as the 
carrier of civilisation and progress. If scientific progress 
was conclusive proof of Europe's superiority for Condorcet, 




























































































civilisation and its mission were identified with the 
competitive entrepreneurship of economic individualism. For 
Carlo Cattaneo, writing in the 1840's, the primacy of Europe - 
in contrast to the static uniformity of eastern civilisations 
was to be found in the dynamic conflict and diversity that 
had generated the. progress of commerce and industry and 
ensured the passage from feudal barbarism to incivilimento
(7) . Cattaneo's European mission, now also bedecked in the 
moral tones of Christian sectarianism, was soon to become 
universally recognisable in the form of the European 
impnineteenthlism of the late nineteenth century.
The second trait which is pointed to as explanation of 
Europe's distinctiveness is its state system. The presence in 
a geographically limited area of the world of a substantial 
number of relatively small and independent states, no one of 
which was capable of imposing its rule over the others, was 
remarked on as early as Montaigne, once again to mark the 
contrast with the empires attributed to oriental despotism. 
The institutional particularity of such a state system, which 
was consolidated in the latter part of the seventeenth 
century, has often been equated with the concept of Europe by 
scholars of international relations, and utilised even by 
economic historians as a partial explanation of why Europe 
developed economically before the other regions of the world
(8) . By the late eighteenth century, and above all following 
on the Napoleonic experience, in the nineteenth century 
theorisation of the relative balance of power among the states 
on the European landmass led to the development of negotiated 
concerted decisions as a regulatory mode of international 
relations, summed up in the expression, the "Concert of 
Europe". Such a system, upheld by common understanding among 
the mutually suspicious and often hostile European states, was 
imposed by them on their weaker neighbours. Perhaps the most 
striking example was that of the Ottoman empire, whose Sultan, 
absolute ruler over territories whose peoples were conceived 




























































































family, was obliged to accept the constitutional form of a 
European sovereign state, thus legitimating the subsequent 
interventions of the European powers (9). Even if the concert 
system was dented by the growing tendency of the great powers 
to retain their freedom of action, and was to collapse with 
the World Wars, it has remained an element peculiar to the 
image of Europe, at most reproduced in other parts of the 
world through the legacies of European imperialism.
The third characteristic of the European tradition can be 
located chronologically with greater precision. I am 
referring to the cult of administrative integration by the 
state. Intrinsic to the development of the absolutist state, 
raised to the level of a science in the eighteenth century 
German Kameralwissenschaft, it was through the Napoleonic 
attempt to integrate Europe on the model of France that the 
administrative state acquired its cultural charisma as a 
modernising force (10). Whether directly, through the 
experience of French rule, or indirectly, even in hostile 
states like Prussia, out of fear or envy of the efficacy of 
the French example, the legacy of the Napoleonic years was to 
impose a particular imprint on the practices and ideology of 
the nineteenth-century nation states of Europe, with the 
exception of England. Bureaucratic dedication and 
administrative centralisation underpinned the leading role 
attributed to the state in its relations with each national 
society. Above all, there can be few more lasting examples of 
cultural exchange than the transference to the national level 
of Napoleon's deliberate depreciation by uniformising 
administrative fiats of the historical, political, cultural, 
social, intellectual, regional and local heterogeneity of 
Europe as a whole. Nation-building, as applied to the 
European nation-states of the past 150 years, in the eyes at 
least of their political leaders, was identified only too 
easily with hostility to pre-existing regional, religious, or 
cultural identities and loyalties, which were regarded as 




























































































uniformising measures inhibitive of 'other' languages, cults 
or traditions in the illusory expectation of attaining a 
monopoly of national loyalty.
The superiority of its civilisation, the peculiarity of 
its state system, the modernity of its administrative mode of 
integrating the nation-state : such are the three constitutive 
elements of the idea of Europe, as it has been represented and 
developed since the Enlightenment. Around them developed a 
process of civilisation recognisable by Europeans and non- 
Europeans alike from the later eighteenth century to the first 
world war : European civilisation was understood as a cluster 
of social phenomena, such as forms of sociability, customs and 
mores, even the substitution of such crude use of 
institutionalised violence as public execution and torture by 
more symbolic means, all of which, in one way or another, were 
closely related to the state.
It is time to turn to our second theme - the nation-state.
The concept of the nation-state, which is conventionally 
attributed to the French Revolution, is understood in two 
different senses. On the one hand, the nation-state is seen 
as a state in which the people are the source of legitimacy, 
in contrast to the absolutism of the rulers of the ancien 
regime states; at the same time, the sovereignty of the state 
and the autonomy of its actions in international relations is 
regarded as reinforced by the legitimation that the state 
derives from its identification with the people, and which 
enables it to demand even the sacrifice of life in the name of 
a higher abstract value.
To date the nation-state to the French Revolution is not 
to deny the existence of patriotism, a quality of supreme 
loyalty to place or people that stands high among the virtues 
from the earliest chronicles (such as the Old Testament Jews 
or Greeks); "pro patria mori" is a well-established tradition 
in medieval Europe, as Kantorowicz has outlined with great 




























































































of states long before the Revolution where, in particular 
circumstances, usually of crisis and threat, the political, 
administrative or religious authorities could obtain the 
support of what we might approximate to the national community 
: for example, late medieval Portugal in its reconquista, 
Elizabethan England at the moment of the Armada, or the Dutch 
as they acquired a sense of nationality through their 
prolonged war of independence against Spain.
But, as historians of early modern Europe have clarified, 
it is all too clear that such ties between the state and its 
inhabitants were exceptional, even in major states like Spain, 
and that where they existed, they were located exclusively 
among the 'political nation1, that is the élites (and, 
sometimes, their immediate clients and dependents). Primary 
loyalties were located elsewhere, at a far more local level 
than state or king - in family and kin, in village, town, or 
region. What has long been well known to anthropologists has 
also become increasingly clear to historians, namely that 
'national'loyalty was not exclusive of other loyalties - even 
during the French Revolution - as identity and loyalty can 
operate contemporaneously at different levels and according to 
the situation, with different emphasis. Europe's past has 
been characterised by the heterogeneity of its societies at 
all levels. Such heterogeneity is evidence, on the one hand, 
of the unequal process of formation of states over the 
centuries, in which only a few of the hundreds of states that 
existed in medieval and early modern times evolved into larger 
and stronger units. On the other hand, heterogeneity 
describes the social and cultural practices, the forms of 
communications and exchanges, the networks of public and 
private powers, of relations of family and religion, of 
friendships and enmities, of social differences and relations 
with which authorities were obliged to transact as they 
extended their sovereignty over a territory. It is this which 




























































































understand them, are only recent phenomena of the nineteenth 
century.
Nationalism used to be seen as something that transcended 
history like a demiurge, permanent, even God-given as a 
fundamental instinct. In such interpretations the assumption 
was made that the nation was implicitly accepted as an ideal 
superior to other loyalties and identities, and hence that the 
achievement of national independence and unity was an 
"inevitable" development in the path of history. For 
nationalist historians, the nation had always existed, and the 
national struggle occurred whenever the "people" (however it 
was defined) became conscious of its identity.
This is not the place, nor the time, to enter into even a 
summary discussion of such nationalist historiography, which 
has marked our way of understanding the present so deeply - 
and so tragically - by its distorted and forced view of our 
national past. It is a historiography ex parte, which only 
too frequently was conveyed officially through school 
textbooks and at public ceremonies as if it were not only a 
consensual, but an actively participatory view. The peak 
period of such historiography coincided with that of the most 
exacerbated form of nationalism in Europe - from about 1870 to 
1945 - when it was imposed as an instrument to nurture
national identity and patriotism, whether in the new nation­
states, like Italy or Germany, or the long established ones, 
like Britain and France. The social transformations of late 
nineteenth century states, with the rapid spread of literacy 
and political participation, as well as the rise in tension 
between states, offered new opportunities for such
unilaterally nationalist historiography, at the same time as 
it rendered it imperative.
Three aspects of the history of nationalism merit 
attention.
First, the historiography of nationalism over the past 20- 
30 years has clarified beyond reasonable doubt how nationalism 




























































































was deliberately constructed, on the basis of language and a 
remote, often mythical historical past, all identified with 
popular practices seen as proof of an uninterrupted 
continuity, through prolonged periods of obscurity and/or so- 
called 'foreign' oppression. The invention of national 
tradition by intellectual elites was based on its rediscovery 
of identity incorporated in simple-and hence 'purer'- people 
(12). The cultural foundations of nationalism were based on 
the construction and standardisation of a language out of one 
of the various vernacular dialects and elements selected from 
contemporary popular culture. The sources of such an idea, of 
course, are not difficult to trace - from Herder's 
identification of Volk and language to Hegel's spirit of a 
people; from the late eighteenth century anthropologists' 
search for evidence of earlier ages of mankind to the 
nineteenth century romantic cult of the primitive as pure. 
What is common to this invention of nationalism, repeated and 
imitated across southern, central and eastern Europe, was the 
necessity of the 'other' against which to identify the 
national self, of the 'foreigner' whose presence provided the 
symbolic catalyst for the discovery of a national identity. 
The passage from cultural nationalism to its political 
expression of organisation, mobilisation and (usually armed) 
struggle was only possible through the identification of the 
'other', hostile to the national 'self'.
Secondly, precisely this necessity of an 'enemy' explains 
the apparent contradiction, always noted by historians, 
between the 'liberating' nationalism of the earlier nineteenth 
century (to 1848, even to the unification of Italy and 
Germany) and the later aggressive, even xenophobic and 
antisemitic nationalism since the end of the nineteenth 
century. Such a change in climate of course exists - it is 
not an irrational Zeitgeist, but historically explicable, as 
it was intimately related to transformations both internal to 
existing states and in relations between states. But the 




























































































periods, i.e'. the affirmation of one's own national identity, 
whether against minorities seen as a threat to the integrity 
of the nation-state; or as a defensive mechanism on the part 
of (at least some) of such minorities in order to strengthen 
their own bonds of identity - above all through insistence on 
language as an expression of culture - against the dangers of 
assimilation or repression.
In two respects, at least, there is a strong continuity in 
the forms and modes of nationalism that characterised Europe 
through the nineteenth century and well into the twentieth 
century. On the one hand, as already mentioned, the legacy of 
administrative modernisation bequeathed by the Napoleonic 
attempt to integrate Europe was accepted by the ruling elites, 
both liberal and conservative, and applied within the confines 
of the nation-state. Administrative centralisation and a 
powerful bureaucracy were identified as indispensable elements 
to strengthen the nation-state, particularly the new ones, 
whose insistence on national loyalty increasingly turned into 
intolerance of regional or ethnic difference. Without the 
administrative force of the state, there could have been no 
question of putting into practice the national linguistically 
uniform educational systems that underpinned the policies of 
Magyarisation or Russification - but equally those of France, 
Britain or Italy. On the other hand, the very model of the 
nation-state, which derived from western Europe, where the 
state existed long before the nation, became mandatory for all 
aspiring national movements. In a world of nation-states, as 
John Breuilly has noted (13), it was inevitable that those who 
spoke on behalf of what they claimed were oppressed nations - 
whether in eastern Europe or in the decrepit Ottoman empire 
should have envisaged independence in the image of the 
existing nation-state not just in terms of national 
sovereignty, but with little tolerance towards their own 
minorities.
The nationalism that characterised the political life of 




























































































century was different because its leaders needed to invent a 
nation as the basis for a state, whereas in western Europe the 
state had long preceded the nation. The Poles could claim 
their recent historic existence as a state, the Bohemian 
Czechs could base their national identity on their social 
homogeneity and economic integration,, as much as on their 
religion. But the continuous movements of population in this 
vast swathe of eastern and south-eastern Europe, that 
accompanied the shifts in frontiers consequential on secular 
religious and political struggles and colonisation, made a 
dangerous nonsense of all attempts to obtain the 
identification of ethnic and territorial claims through self- 
determination.
What was different in nationalism from the 1890's was its 
social composition. In the early nineteenth century 
nationalist movements were composed of small groups drawn from 
intellectuals, the professional classes, businessmen and 
landed gentry, with extensions among the urban skilled 
artisans. By the late nineteenth century, the social 
tensions, fissures, and class antagonisms that resulted from 
the pressures of technological developments, the expanding 
penetration of the capitalist market, urbanisation and the 
rapid extension of communications and education, led to the 
emergence of semi-educated, status-conscious, and easily 
resentful petty bourgeois and white collar workers, who were 
to prove a receptive public for virulent nationalism. It was 
this nationalism that was to heighten the tensions that led to 
the first world war, to provide a fertile terrain for 
authoritarian and fascist ideologies and regimes, and now (if 
I may be permitted an unfashionable observation) to reemerge 
after the prolonged and very serious attempts of many of the 
communist regimes to defuse ethnic hatreds.
The third aspect that emerges from the study of European 
nation-states is the very subordination of the concept of 
Europe during the period when European power was at its 




























































































representation of Europe was essentially of two kinds: either 
as synonymous with the affirmation of the political and 
economic power of the leading European nation-states across 
the world; or as a form of rhetoric, to be deployed against 
whatever was seen as the threat of 'others'. The threat could 
be outside Europe in the shape of the growing power of rival 
states, expressed in the rhetoric of the 'yellow peril' 
(transferred from China to Japan) or of the anti-Americanism 
that left so deep a mark on the intellectuals between the 
interwar years and after 1945. But we should recall how the 
threat could also be internal to Europe, as in the reluctance 
of the leaders of achieved nationalisms to recognise the 
droit de cité of others, whether through the discriminatory 
distinction between 'historic' and other nations of a Mazzini, 
or in the harsh terms of the Realpolitik of a Bismark, who 
dismissed the claims of the nationalists of the Austro- 
Hungarian empire with the words that "New creations in this 
territory could only be such as bear a permanently 
revolutionary character" (14). It is perhaps opportune to 
recall the responsibility of the western states for the 
subversive character of nationalism in eastern Europe since 
1918, with their insistence on imposing frontiers that left 
perhaps 20 to 25 million people as national minorities, their 
presumption that national independence should be accompanied 
by their own forms of parliamentary representation (which 
rapidly degenerated through manipulated elections and sham 
procedures), and perhaps above all with their maintenance of 
the economic dependence of these eastern European nation­
states .
If Europe existed as more than a geographic expression, 
historically it has long been characterised more by the 
political divisions of its nation-states than by the recurrent 




























































































It is time to draw together the two parts of my discourse, 
with some reflection on the implications of the historical 
relationship between Europe and the nation-state.
We have seen how the identities of both Europe and the 
nation-state were cultural constructs of the late eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. We have observed how the concept of 
Europe was elaborated exclusively by intellectuals, whereas 
the idea of the nation, in order to become politically 
significant, required broader social support. Historically, 
not only is this passage from a cultural invention to a 
political reality not inevitable; it is not always, perhaps 
not even usually successful. But there can be no doubt that 
by the late nineteenth century the nation-state had become a 
powerful ideological force, capable of mobilising vast sectors 
of society, at least at moments of real or fabricated crisis. 
In part, nationalism derived its strength from the profound 
transformations of society: marxism and ethnic minorities 
provided the 'other', against whom nationalists could 
construct an anti-socialist and anti-democratic language of 
intolerance, reaction and aggression that obtained a resonance 
among the newly participant masses. In part, the very process 
of nation-building, with the insistence on educational and 
military patriotism, slowly instilled a new loyalty to the 
nation-state, not necessarily superior to, or even 
incompatible with class, ethnic, religious or other loyalties
at least until the overwhelming force of the state 
apparatuses imposed a manichean straightjacket of patriotism 
and anti-patriotism in 1914.
The result was further to subordinate the concept of 
Europe to the exaltation of the nation-state. It would not be 
out of place to describe the role of historians in 
constructing such national myths in the twentieth century as 
an authentic trahison des clercs; which also explains their 
embarrassment and difficulties in coming to terms with how to 




























































































existed primarily as the cockpit of unprecedented nationalist 
excesses which were in fundamental contradiction to any 
pretension to the superiority of European civilisation (except 
perhaps for its technology of destruction). It is 
understandable why in the decades since the end of the second 
world war, revulsion at the horrors of nazism and fascism, in 
which nationalism had achieved its most negative paroxysm, 
should have led to a more limited approach towards the nation­
state and an upgrading of the concept of Europe. Nor is it 
surprising, given the pace and scale of change throughout the 
world over the past half century and the difficult emergence 
and consolidation of the European Community - an institutional 
structure without precedent in European history - that there 
should be a generous urge to substitute a 'history of Europe' 
in the place of the history of Europe's nation-states. But 
how can such a history of Europe ignore the history of its 
nation-states, or avoid slipping into the same dangers of the 
invention of tradition, the construction of a European myth? 
For to believe that there is a "Europe" embedded in, or the 
culmination of, the long, contradictory and often violent 
history of the societies and states of the European continent, 
is to risk falling into the same historical fallacy of 
determinism that nationalists created for their own nation­
states. As nations had to be built after the achievement of 
independence of new states, so the construction of a European 
citizenship belongs to the agenda of the present and the 
future, far more than to the past.
To conclude, let me return to the three elements that I 
identified as essential to the representation of the 
superiority of Europe : its state system, the superiority of 
its civilisation and its development of administration as the 
instrument of modernisation. Where the Europe in which we 
live has been most successful - incomparably more than the 
statesmen of the interwar years such as Briand - has been in 
building on the terrible experiences of the two world wars and 




























































































states into pacific collaboration, based ultimately on 
reciprocal trust. Where it has been least successful, in a 
world of pluricultural relativity, is in claims to the 
superiority of European civilisation. For such claims are 
essentially rhetorical, based on a complacent image of the 
European past, which is stridently in contradiction with the 
savage, internecine realities of this past, and lacking the 
moral tension and specific aims that have characterised the 
networks and language of those earlier European intellectual 
projects (such as the Renaissance or Enlightenment) on which 
claims of the continuity of Europe's uniqueness are based. 
Unless, of course, such superiority is equated, tout court, 
with western market capitalism.
It is the third element - administrative modernisation 
that requires a more nuanced reply. I have argued that the 
particular identity of each nation-state and the heterogeneity 
that has characterised, and continues to characterise, 
European societies are the results of the struggles and 
compromises by which each successful state asserted its 
sovereignty over communities, with their specific social and 
cultural practices, of successively expanding territories. 
The conflictuality of such local socio-political identities 
was absorbed but also carried over to the larger and more 
complex nation-states, and was subordinated through discourses 
of internal solidarity and national identity primarily by 
being directed externally, against 'other' nation-states. 
Once forged, such national identities, as Tom Nairn has 
observed, are particularly resistant to change and attack 
(16).
It is undoubtedly true, as Helmut Kaelble has shown (17), 
that in many fundamental respects national societies in Europe 
have changed in a convergent manner, particularly since the 
1960's. At the same time, it is unquestionable that the power 
of every European state has declined, both as economic units 
(for national economies are no longer autonomous) and in 




























































































nationalism within western and eastern European states may be 
linked to this decline of the nation-state and can certainly 
be related to the dramatic economic changes and shrinking of 
the world through instantaneous communications over the past 
three decades. Such regional nationalism has arguably 
accentuated the sense of local identity in Europe at the very 
time that western national societies have converged through 
forms of primarily economic modernisation.
It is problematic, as Kaelble recognises, to ascribe such 
developments to the European Community, although the 
Community's policies have contributed and facilitated them. 
What is striking is the continuity between the methods of 
modernisation from above by administrative action, adopted 
earlier by the national states of Europe, and forged at the 
intra-European level by the European Community. Few would deny 
the economic benefits of this unprecedented development, which 
has stoked up the utopie expectations of the nations of 
eastern Europe. But perhaps it may be permitted to a 
historian to enter a warning word about the corollary to the 
faith in administrative modernisation - its innate tendency to 
impose a uniformising grid. Identities and loyalties cannot 
be regulated out of existence, except at great cost, as the 
nation-states have learnt so painfully. The European nation­
states are still learning that national identity and national 
loyalty are not necessarily incompatible with, or even 
antagonistic towards, multicultural, multiethnic societies. 
How much more important must this be in the building of a 
European identity (in which the writing of its history plays a 
not insignificant role), given the cultural and historical 
heterogeneity that is of the very essence of Europe. Writing 
about France, administratively the most unified of nation­
states, the great historian Fernand Braudel insisted on its 
diversity. His words apply with an even greater force to 
Europe: "La diversité est donc fille première de la distance, 




























































































du fond des âges. Mais, à son tour, cette diversité de longue 
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